

Autoinganno: con o senza agente? Sui rischi della fallacia di equivocazione per la spiegazione causale

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Self-Deception: With or Without an Agent? On the Risks of a Fallacy of Equivocation for the Causal Account

Abstract: In this comment I raise doubts about Galeotti's view that classic motivationalism is a purely causal account where the epistemic agent has no clear place. I argue that while Galeotti is right at including the epistemic agent into the picture, it is less clear that classic motivationalism does not do that.

Keywords: Self-deception, Agent, Causation, Fallacy of equivocation.

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